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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
By

JAMES SCHOONMAKER*

T mabe assumed that the members of the bar understand the
meaning of the words "declaratory" and "judgment," but
as the "declaratory judgment," so called, is not a part of our
common law, it is probable that few understand just what is
meant by that term.
The purpose hereof is to briefly explain what is meant by the
term "declaratory judgment," and call attention to a few of its
advantages, both to the public and the profession. Those who
wish to go into the subject more fully are referred to the able
brief by Edwin M. Borchard, Professor of Law, Yale University, submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, in 1919, in support of the bill (S. 5304) to authorize federal courts to render declaratory judgments. A copy may be obtained by writing Senator Knute Nelson. I am indebted largely
to Professor Borchard for the matter herein contained.
We have in Minnesota two classes of judgments, namely:
First, executory or coercive; and, second, constitutive or investitive.
Judgments of the first class are based on some past violation
of right or an immediately threatened violation thereof which
will result in irreparably injury, that is, injury not compensated
by money damages, and they are followed by coercion. For instance, damages are awarded against a party, or he is commanded to do or refrain from doing something. If he disobeys the
mandate of the judgment he may be coerced by execution, contempt proceedings, etc.
The second class of judgments effect same change of status
and constitute a source of new jural relations, but in their
simplest form they order nothing to be done-are not coercive.
Among such judgments are order and decrees admitting wills,
determining descent of property, appointing guardians and receivers, dissolving and annulling marriages, and adjudications in
bankruptcy. These judgments, like executory judgments, are
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based upon some past act or condition, and involve rights and
duties but neither class are strictly declaratory.
Declaratory judgments, on the other hand, do not presuppose
a legal wrong, nor are they followed by coercive relief as they
simply declare a right, duty, relation, immunity, disability, etc.
In the language of Prof. Borchard:
"Their distinctice characteristic lies in the fact that they
constitute merely an authentic confirmation of already existing
relations."
It is well settled that "equity will not interfere for the purpose of declaring rights to prevent a possible controversy which
has not yet arisen."'
It is equally well settled that our present system of jurisprudence furnishes no means whereby a party to a contract may
obtain an authoritative construction of the contract for his
guidance except by breaching it and submitting himself to damages, and this is especially true if it involves any question of fact.
The absurdity and gross injustice of this rule is aptly illustrated by the recent case of Dreiser v. John Lane Co., 2 decided
in 1918. The parties had entered into a contract providing for
the publication of plaintiff's book on a royality basis. A certain
society for the prevention of vice claimed that the book was
obscene, and threatened criminal prosecution. The parties submitted to the court upon an agreed state of fact the question as
to whether the book was obscene, but the court held that it was
not a proper matter for judicial determination on voluntary submission.
That both legislatures and courts are drifting away from these
absurd and unjust judge made rules is evidenced by the recent
enactments and decisions hereinafter mentioned.
Space will not permit tracing the history of the declaratory
judgment. Suffice it to say that its origin is in the Roman Law,
and from this source it later found its way into other parts of
Europe. In various forms it has been in use in different countries about as follows: In Scotland, for 400 years; in France,
for several centuries; in England, since 1852; in Germany, since
1877; in India, since 1859; and from various dates since 1853,
in Australia, New Zealand, Queensland, Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba and other Canadian Provinces. It was in use in
116 Cyc. 102.
2171 N. Y. S. 605.
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Italy during the middle ages, and in modern times in Spain and
Spanish America.
The English courts were vested with power to render declaratory judgments by enactments in terms or by statutes authorizing court rules, and in short form. The act of 1852 is as
follows:
"No suit . . . shall be open to objection on the ground

that a merely declaratory decree or order is sought thereby, and
it shall be lawful for the court to make binding declarations of
right without granting consequential relief."
The court rule in 1883 is as follows:
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a merely declaratory judgment is sought thereby,
and the court may make binding declarations of right whether
any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not."
The amended rule of 1893 is as follows:
"In any division of the high court, any person claiming to be
interested under a deed, will or other instrument, may apply by
original summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of
the rights of the person interested."
The bill introduced in Congress in 1919 (S. 5304), after the
enacting clause is as follows:
"The district courts, the circuit courts of appeals, and the
Supreme Court of the United States shall have power in any
action or in an independent or interlocutory proceeding, to declare rights and other legal relations on written request for such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed;
and such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment."
Wisconsin 3 and Michigan4 enacted in 1919 statutes authorizing declaratory relief.
3Wis. Laws 1919 c. 242 reads as follows:
"Equitable action to obtain declaratory relief may be brought and
maintained in the circuit court and in matters of which the supreme court
has original jurisdiction in the supreme court, and it shall be no objection
to the maintenance of such action that no consequential relief is sought
or can be granted if it appears that substantial doubt or controversy exists
as to the right or duties of parties, and that either public or private interests be materially promoted by a declaration of the right or duty in advance of any actual or threatened inyasion of right or default in duty. The
judgment rendered in such an action shall bind all the parties thereto and
and final as to the rights and duties involved."
be conclusive
4
Mich. Pub. Acts 1919 No. 150 reads as follows:
"An act to authorize courts of record to make binding declarations
of rights.
"Sec. 1. No action or proceeding in any court of record shall be
open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment,
decree, or order is sought thereby, and the court may make binding
declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or could be
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The cumbersome form of the equitable action to remove a
cloud from the title of real property and the artificial restrictions with which it is incumbered have led to the enactment of
statutes authorizing any person claiming an interest in land (in
some cases the claimant must be in possession or the land must
be vacant) to bring an action to determine adverse claims. The
complaint simply alleges the ultimate facts as to the plaintiff's
interest, that is, his ownership or possession, or both, or that the
land is vacant; and that the defendant claims adversely. The
judgment simply declares the plaintiff's right and that the defendant has no claim. These judgments are simply judicial
declarations of rights without any consequential relief, and hence
are pure declaratory judgments, though not in name.
At least Connecticut has gone further and eliminated the questions of possession and occupancy and included personal property
by the enactment of a statute authorizing any person claiming an
interest in real or personal property to bring an action against
claimed, or not, including the determination, at the instance of anyone
claiming to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument,
of any question of construction arising under the instrument and a declaration of the rights of the parties interested.
"Sec. 2. Declarations of rights and determination of questions of
construction, as herein provided for, may be obtained by means of ordinary proceedings at law or in equity, or by means of a petition on
either the law -or the equity side of the court as the nature 6f the
case may require, and where a declaration of rights is the only relief
asked, the case may be noticed for early hearing as in case of a motion.
"Sec. 3. Where further relief based upon a declaration of rights
shall become necessary or proper after such declaration has been made,
application may be made by petition to any court having jurisdiction to
grant such relief, for an order directed to any party or parties whose
rights have been determined by such declaration, to show cause why such
further relief should not be granted forthwith upon such reasonable
notice as shall be prescribed by the Court in said Order.
"Sec. 4. When a declaration of rights, or the granting of further
relief thereon, shall involve the determination of issues of fact by a jury,
such issues may be submitted to a jury in form of interrogatories, with
such instructions by the court as may be proper, whether a general verdict be rendered or required or not, and such interrogatories and answers
shall constitute a part of the record of the case.
"Sec. 5. Unless the parties shall agree by stipulation as to the allowance thereof, costs in proceedings authorized by this act shall "be allowed
in accordance with such special rules as the supreme court may make,
and in the absence of such rules the practice followed in ordinary cases
at law or in equity shall be followed wherever applicable, and when
not applicable, the costs or such part thereof as to the court may seem
just, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, may be awarded
to either party.
"Sec. 6. This act is declared to be remedial, and is to be liberally construed and liberally administered with a view of making the courts
more serviceable to the people."
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any person claiming adversely to determine such adverse claim
and clear the title.'
Our action to determine adverse claim was at first limited
to a plaintiff in possession of real property, but was later extended to unoccupied lands. I have never been able to understand
the reason for these limitations, nor why the action should not
be also applied to personal property. The Connecticut statute
is a great improvement upon our statute, and ours has proven
so convenient and effective that no one would think of repealing it.

Our statute authorizing the registration of land under the
Torrens system is another illustration of the use of a declaratory
judgment. The court determines all interests, claims and liens
affecting the land, including mechanics' liens of record, but it
grants no consequential relief unless the direction to the registrar
may be termed such. Thus a mechanic's lien may be adjudged
against the land, but it cannot be foreclosed in the registration
proceedings.'
In at least three cases our supreme court has sustained declaratory relief though in neither case is the principle of the declaatory judgment discussed as such. I refer to Fitzpatrick v. Si9
monson7 Porten v. Peterson,8 and Slingerland v. Slingerland.
In the Fitzpatrick case the court sustained a judgment as final
which determines title to real property by descent under law 1897,
c. 157, though the judgment was purely declaratory and granted
no consequential relief. In the Slingerland case the plaintiff was
permitted to maintain an action to cancel an antenuptial contract
although the defendant had taken no affirmative action, and
though the plaintiff's inchoate dower right might never vest.
The court says:
"Courts are established, and law and equity administered,
for the purpose of justice in the adjustment of differences between man and man. .

.

. In addition it would seem that now,

while the parties to the instrument are alive and capable of
testifying fully to the facts, is the appropriate time for the
adjustment of the controversy."
5Conn. Pub. Acts 1915, ch. 174.
GReed v. Siddall, (1905) 94 Minn. 216, 102 N. W. 453.
7(1902) 86 Minn. 140, 90 N. W. 378.
8(1918) 139 Minn. 152, 166 N. W. 183.
9
Slingerland v. Slingerland, (1910) 109 Minn. 407, 410, 411, 124 N.
W. 19.
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Certainly the above statement cannot successfully be controverted, and yet we know that this "appropriate time" consideration has not been sufficient to induce courts to grant declartory
relief.
The Porten case was an action for specific performance of
an oral land contract, which was denied by the defendant. The
plaintiff was in possession, but not having made all required
payments was not in postion to demand specific performance.
The question involved was whether under such circumstances he
could have his equitable title adjudicated. The court says at
page 155: "We find no case directly in point." At page 156
the court quotes the last part of the above quotation from the
Slingerland case, and among other things says: "There as here
the only effect of the decree was to determine the right."
The logical reasoning and the just and salutary results
reached in these two cases are not supported by the reported
cases. At least, as stated by Justice Dibell in the Porten case,
I find no case directly in point. Nor do I find any case holding
the declaratory relief alone may be granted independent of
statute.
There is scarcely any limit to the questions concerning which
declarations would be most useful in the administration of justice.
Any one desiring more specific enumeration will do well to consuit a digest of the many reported English cases. That the
declaratory judgment has become most useful in England is
proven by the fact that 66 per cent of the reported cases in the
second chancery division in 1917 were declarations. Concerning
the uses of the declaratory judgment I quote from Prof. Borchard
as follows:
"As a measure of preventive justice, the declaratory judgment probably has its greatest efficacy. It is designed to enable
parties to ascertain and establish their legal relations so as to
conduct themselves accordingly, and thus to avoid the necessity
of future litigation.
"It is further designed to enable trustees, executors, receivers, and others who act in a fiduciary capacity and whose proper
execution of such trusts is a matter of public as well as private
interest, to obtain authoritative advice and guidance in the performance of their duties."
The enactment of a statute vesting our district courts and the
supreme court with power to grant declaratory relief would only
be an extension of the principle involved in our action to deter-
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mine adverse claims and in our registration of land titles, and
recognized in the decisions of the Slingerland and Porten cases
above mentioned.
The principle of the declaratory judgment was unanimously
indorsed by the State Bar Association at its recent meeting; and
that it will be indorsed and appreciated by the people of this state
as a convenient and effective means of adjusting controversies
between man and man is proven by the experience of England
and a large part of the civilized world.
Again I quote from Professor Borchard as follows:
"Its simplicity, its capacity to serve important ends of corrective justice without legal hostilities, its utility in deciding many
questions which can not now be brought to judicial cognizance,
its efficacy in removing uncertainty from legal relations before
they have ripened into a cause of action-that is, its usefulness
as an instrument of preventive justice, a field which has hardly
begun to be cultivated in this country, commend the declaratory
judgment to the earnest attention of the American Bar and of
the public which it serves."
One question remains for consideration and that is the form
of the enactment. Shall we simply vest our courts with power
to grant declaratory relief as was done in England and is proposed by the bill in Congress, or shall we also prescribe more or
less of the procedure as was done in Wisconsin and Michigan?
If we were all familiar with the declaratory judgment and the
pertinent English decisions, then I would say that a brief statute
vesting the courts with this power would be sufficient; but the
fact is that neither the judges nor the members of the bar are
familiar with these judgments and decisions, and it would be
no surprise if they were inclined to construe it strictly instead of
liberally as a remedial measure, and thus greatly limit its usefulness. For this reason it might be advisable to prescribe more
or less of the procedure.
Before the meeting of the next legislature I shall prepare a
bill authorizing our courts to grant declaratory relief. In the
meantime I shall be pleased to receive suggestions as to its
form.10
loSince the above was written I have learned that the Michigan statute
above mentioned has been held unconstitutional in Anway v. Ry. Co.,
(Mich. 1920) 179 N. W. 350. I will refer to this case in a later article.

